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DETERMINING THE OBLIGATION TO DEFEND
UNDER INDEMNITY CONTRACTS GOVERNED BY
LOUISIANA LAW
Mary Brandt Jensen*
For several years it has been difficult to determine when an in-
demnitor has an obligation to defend an indemnitee under the terms of
an indemnity agreement governed by Louisiana law. Indemnitees have
argued that, even where the indemnitor is not obligated to indemnify
the indemnitee for his own negligence or fault, the indemnitor should
be required to pay the indemnitee's defense costs when the indemnitee
is ultimately found to be free of fault. Indemnitors, on the other hand,
argue that they should not be required to defend any case containing
allegations, which if proved, would preclude indemnification for the
judgment against the indemnitee. As Judge Politz observed in Sullen v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,' the response of the courts has been
ambivalent. In both state and federal courts applying Louisiana law,
some cases have accepted the indemnitees' arguments and other cases
have accepted the indemnitors' arguments. Other states are also split.
Florida, North Dakota, and Alaska hold that the pleadings rather than
the outcome on the liability issue determine the obligation to defend.2
Iowa and Georgia look to the outcome on the liability issue and adopt
the indemnitees' arguments on the obligation to defend.3 This article
will trace the history of the obligation to defend in cases applying
Louisiana law. It will also present the arguments in favor of both the
pleading and outcome approaches and discuss how these arguments apply
to common indemnity situations.
THE HISTORY OF THE OBLIGATION TO DEFEND IN FEDERAL COURT
The history of the obligation to defend in federal court can be
divided into four major periods. During the first period, which covers
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the time before Stephens v. Chevron Oil Co. 4 and Smith v. Chevron
Oil Co., 5 the obligation to defend was never the major issue in a case.
The second period began the day that Stephens and Smith were decided
and ended when Sullen was decided. During this period, the federal
courts routinely followed Stephens and Smith when they appeared to
be applicable. This period ended when Sullen declared that Stephens
had misstated Louisiana law on the obligation to defend. During the
third period, lasting less than a year, Sullen was followed without much
criticism. Opinions in the fourth period criticized Sullen and recognized
the apparent inconsistency in the Louisiana cases addressing the issue.
The First Period
The federal courts quickly established that the duty to indemnify
included the duty to defend. As early as 1955 in Pure Oil Co. v.
Geotechnical Corp.,6 the district court observed that "[tihere seems little
question that, whether the indemnity is implied in law or arises under
contract, reasonable counsel fees and costs incurred in resisting the
liability indemnified against may be recovered."" No case before or since
Pure Oil has argued that the indemnitor should be relieved of respon-
sibility for defense costs in a case where the indemnitor is required to
pay a judgment against an indemnitee. Aside from the quoted language,
Pure Oil said little about the obligation to defend.
The cases following Pure Oil during the first period also said little
about the obligation to defend. They tended to dispose of the issue in
a few sentences, often without reference to any source of authority and
with no discussion of how the obligation to defend ought to be deter-
mined. When authority was cited, the citation was usually to a case
which had itself disposed of the issue in a few short sentences without
giving any reasons to support the conclusion. While some of the cases
admitted that Louisiana law controlled the interpretation of the indemnity
agreement, few cited any Louisiana cases to support their conclusion
on the indemnitor's duty to defend.
While the cases decided during the first period spent little time
discussing the issue, a close analysis of the decisions reveals a pattern.
When the injured party's claim was not covered by the indemnity agree-
ment, attorneys' fees were not awarded regardless of the outcome of
the case.' When the injured party's claim was covered by the contract,
4. 517 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1975).
5. 517 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1975).
6. 129 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La. 1955).
7. 129 F. Supp. at 198.
8. See Cole v. Chevron Chem. Co., 477 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
978, 94 S. Ct. 300 (1973)(injured party won); Despaux v. California Co., 286 F. Supp.
558 (E.D. La. 1968)(case settled).
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the courts awarded attorneys' fees regardless of the outcome of the
case. 9 The issue of attorneys' fees and costs in these cases turned on
whether the contract covered the injured party's claim.' 0
In determining this issue, allegations of indemnitee fault created the
most controversy.'' Most of the contracts in cases from the first period
required the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee against any claims
brought by the indemnitor's employees. The courts usually found that
these contracts covered claims alleging that the indemnitee was at fault. 2
Nevertheless, when the indemnity clause at issue did not concern claims
made by the indemnitor's employees, the courts were less likely to
interpret the contract as covering claims alleging that the indemnitee
was at fault. 3
The Second Period
The second period began with Smith v. Chevron Oil Co. " and
Stephens v. Chevron Oil Co., 5 the first cases where the obligation to
defend was a major issue. Unlike the earlier cases, these cases devoted
more than a few lines to the issue, but they too failed to consult the
existing Louisiana cases which had disposed of claims for attorneys'
fees and defense costs.
In Smith, an employee of Ocean Sciences, an independent contractor
of Chevron, sued Chevron for negligently maintaining a rope used to
transfer men between a platform and a boat. Chevron tendered its
defense to Ocean Sciences pursuant to the indemnity agreement which
required Ocean Sciences to defend and indemnify Chevron against con-
9. See Loffland Bros. Co. v. Roberts, 386 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1040, 88 S. Ct. 778 (1986)(injured party won); Cormier v. Rowan Drilling Co.,
67 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd, 549 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1977)(injured party won);
Storm Drilling Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 386 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. La. 1974)(injured
party lost); Elston v. Shell Oil Co., 376 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d
1371 (5th Cir. 1974)(injured party won); Todd v. James E. Dean Marine Divers, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 453 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1972)(case settled);
Williams v. California Co., 289 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. La. 1968)(injured party lost); White
v. California Co., 260 F. Supp. 586 (W.D. La. 1965)(case settled); Collette v. Marine
Exploration Co., 213 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. La. 1963)(injured party lost); Pure Oil, 129 F.
Supp. 194 (injured party won).
10. See Loffland, 386 F.2d 540; Cole v. Chevron Chem. Co., 334 F. Supp. 263
(E.D. La. 1971), rev'd, 477 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 978, 94 S. Ct.
300 (1973); Collette, 213 F. Supp. 609.
11. See Loffland, 386 F.2d 540; Cole, 334 F. Supp. 263; Williams, 289 F. Supp.
376.
12. See Loffland, 386 F.2d 540; Todd, 325 F. Supp. 18; Williams, 289 F. Supp.
376; White, 260 F. Supp. 586. But see Despaux, 286 F. Supp. 558.
13. See Cole, 477 F.2d at 368.
14. 517 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1975).
15. 517 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tract related personal injury claims brought by Ocean Sciences' em-
ployees.1 6 Ocean Sciences refused to defend or indemnify Chevron. The
district court found that Chevron's negligence was the sole cause of the
accident and denied Chevron's defense and indemnity claim, because
the indemnity agreement did not provide for indemnity by Ocean Sciences
for Chevron's own negligence.' 7 On appeal Chevron argued that, even
if the contract did not provide for indemnity for its own negligence, it
did require Ocean Sciences to pay for the costs of Chevron's defense.
The appeals court found that the obligation to defend was not severable
from the obligation to indemnify, and therefore, there was no obligation
under the agreement to defend Chevron against its own negligent acts.
In making this finding, the court cited Despaux v. California Co. 8 and
stated:
[Tihe duty to defend [is] an extension of the duty to indemnity
[sic] and ... the indemnitor hals] no contractual obligation to
reimburse the indemnitee for its costs in defending its own
negligence ...
Inasmuch as Ocean Sciences is not obligated to indemnify
Chevron for Chevron's negligence under the contractual provi-
sion in question, we hold that Ocean Sciences is not required
to reimburse Chevron for the cost which it incurred in defending
Smith's claim. 9
While Smith involved a situation in which the indemnitee was the
sole party found at fault, in Stephens, decided on the same day, the
court discussed the situation where neither the indemnitee nor the in-
demnitor was ultimately found at fault. Stephens was an oil worker
employed by Axelson, an independent contractor of Chevron. He sued
Chevron, alleging that Chevron negligently allowed its workboat and
wharf to become slick with oil, thus causing the accident. No other
16. The indemnity agreement provided, in pertinent part:
"Contractor (Ocean Sciences] agrees to defend and hold Company [Chevron]
indemnified and harmless from and against any loss, expense, claim or demand
for:
"(a) Injury to or death of Contractor's employees or for damage to
or loss of Contractor's property in any way arising out of or connected
with the performance by Contractor of services hereunder."
517 F.2d at 1156.
17. This departure from the pattern set by earlier cases which found that similar
contract language covered claims of indemnitee negligence brought by the indemnitor's
employees (see cases cited supra note 12) was caused by a change in the attitude of the
Louisiana courts concerning the type of language necessary to cover claims of indemnitee
negligence. See Cole, 477 F.2d at 368.
18. 286 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1968).
19. 517 F.2d at 1158.
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defendants were named and no basis for liability other than Chevron's
independent negligence was alleged. Chevron tendered its defense to
Axelson under an indemnity clause identical to the clause in Smith,20
and Axelson refused to accept the tender. Chevron then filed a third
party claim against Axelson for indemnification and reimbursement of
expenses. Before trial the district court dismissed the third party demand.
The jury found that Chevron was not negligent and denied Stephens'
claim. The appeals court stated that, although the indemnity provision
did not entitle Chevron to be indemnified against its own negligence,
had the suit against Chevron been based upon anything other than its
own negligence, then the indemnity clause would probably have been
applicable." The court stated that under Louisiana law the intent of
the parties is of paramount importance in interpreting a written agree-
ment. Then, without citing any authority from Louisiana or elsewhere,
the court simply stated:
Under these rules of construction, the contract between Chevron
and Axelson clearly created a duty on the part of Axelson to
defend and hold Chevron harmless against the claim of Stephens,
if it in any way arose out of or was connected with Axelson's
services to Chevron. 22
The court interpreted the agreement as covering all claims in any manner
connected with Axelson's presence and provision of services to Chevron
with one small exclusion that relieved Axelson of any obligation to pay
a judgment based solely on Chevron's own negligence.
In reaching its conclusion, it is obvious that the court in Stephens
relied in part upon the ultimate outcome of the case and did not rely
solely upon the pleadings and the terms of the contract. The opinion
in Smith, standing alone, is not as clear. A person reading Smith for
the first time, without knowledge of Stephens, would have no reason
to believe that the Smith court consulted the outcome of the trial rather
than relying exclusively on the pleadings. When Smith and Stephens are
read together, however, it is clear that on August 22, 1975, the fifth
circuit clearly took the position that the final outcome on the merits
determined the indemnitor's obligation to defend the case from the
beginning of the action.
After Smith and Stephens, the cases of the second period reverted
to the old practice of deciding the defense issue with little discussion.
The pattern of decisions, however, showed a marked change, as the
outcome on the liability issue clearly became an important factor in
20. See supra note 16.
21. 517 F.2d at 1125.
22. Id.
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deciding whether to award attorneys' fees. As in the first period, courts
awarded attorneys' fees when the contract expressly provided for in-
demnity for the indemnitee's negligence regardless of the outcome on
the liability issue." If the contract did not expressly provide for indemnity
for the indemnitee's own negligence and the indemnitee was ultimately
found to be negligent, neither defense nor indemnity was owed.24 If the
contract did not expressly provide for indemnity for the indemnitee's
own negligence, and the indemnitee was ultimately found free of fault,
the indemnitor was required to pay the indemnitee's defense costs.25 If
the contract covered all claims except those caused solely by the indem-
nitee's own negligence, defense costs were awarded if the indemnitee
was found free of fault or if anyone other than the indemnitee was
found to be partially at fault.2 6
The district courts tried to extend the rationale of Smith and Stephens
to strict liability claims by refusing to award attorneys' fees where the
contract did not specifically mention strict liability and the indemnitee
was found to be strictly liable, but the fifth circuit refused to extend
the rationale when the case was based solely on strict liability.2 1 When
the case was based upon both strict liability and negligence, however,
the Smith/Stephens approach appears to have been applied. Where the
contract did not specifically mention either negligence or strict liability,
and the indemnitee was found to be free of both negligence and strict
liability fault, defense costs were awarded. 28 Likewise, when the contract
specifically covered the indemnitee's own negligence, attorneys' fees were
23. See Thibodeaux v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 548 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1977).
Thibodeaux was settled before trial and thus there was no finding on the negligence issue
which could affect the defense issue.
24. See Smith, 517 F.2d 1154; Samuel v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 587 F. Supp. 462
(M.D. La. 1984)(The contract did not specifically mention negligence, but the court said
that it would have awarded attorneys' fees even if the indemnitee had been negligent.
587 F. Supp. at 465. The basis for this dicta is unclear.).
25. See Lirette v. Popich Bros. Water Transp., Inc., 699 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983);
Hobbs v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 632 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980); Stephens, 517
F.2d 1123.
26. See Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 746 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1984)(The opinion does not
mention defense costs, but indemnity was required, and under Pure Oil if indemnity is
owed, defense is also owed.); Dozier v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 587 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.
La. 1984). Tarlton v. Exxon, 688 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1026,
103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983), contained similar contract language, but neither indemnity nor
attorneys' fees were awarded because the act which caused the injury was found to be
outside the scope of the contract.
27. See Hyde v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 514 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. La. 1981), rev'd,
697 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 595 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S. Ct. 480 (1979).
28. See O'Neal v. International Paper Co., 715 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 47
OBLIGATION TO DEFEND
awarded when the indemnitee was sued both on the basis of strict
liability and negligence.29
Near the end of the second period, the newly enacted Louisiana
Oilfield Indemnity Act 30 (the Act) began to create questions about the
results required by the Smith/Stephens approach. The Act declared void
all contract provisions requiring defense and indemnity for the indem-
nitee's own negligence or strict liability. In Home Insurance Co. v.
Garber Industries,3 ' the western district said that under the Act, the
indemnitee was prohibited from recovering damages assessed or defense
costs if it was ultimately found liable, but that it could recover defense
costs if it were ultimately found not liable. A few years later, however,
the same court rejected an argument that the indemnitee could recover
defense costs if it were ultimately found not liable and pointed out that
the Act specifically refers to and invalidates defense provisions as well
as indemnity provisions. 2
The Third Period
The second period came to an end and the third period began early
in 1985 when the fifth circuit reconsidered the obligation to defend
under a Stephens type indemnity clause in Sullen v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co." 'for the first time a federal court carefully examined
Louisiana case law on the issue before reaching its decision. Broadmoor
contracted with Chevron to provide workmen to clean tank cars at
Chevron's plant. Sullen, an employee of Broadmoor, sued Chevron
alleging that Chevron's negligence caused his injuries. Sullen made no
allegations which would provide for liability on any other basis. Chevron
filed a third party indemnity demand against Broadmoor. Chevron also
filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that it was Sullen's
statutory employer and thus the action was barred by worker's com-
pensation law, and Broadmoor filed a motion for summary judgment
on the indemnity demand. The trial court granted Chevron's motion
and declared Broadmoor's motion moot because the primary claim had
been dismissed. Chevron appealed, arguing that the indemnity claim was
not moot because it was entitled to recover attorneys' fees and the costs
of its defense. The court observed an apparent parallel between Louisiana
29. See Mallory v. Hydraulic Workover, Inc., 617 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1980).
30. La. R.S. 9:2780 (Supp. 1986)(also known as the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity
Act).
31. 588 F. Supp. 1218 (W.D. La. 1984).
32. See Aucoin v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. La. 1984).
33. 750 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1985)(The contract in Sullen was entered into before the
Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act was enacted and thus the Act had no effect upon the
decision.).
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indemnity cases and insurance cases discussing the obligation to defend.
Relying on the more expansive insurance cases and the specific language
in two opinions referring to the allegations in the pleadings as a con-
trolling factor, the fifth circuit decided that Louisiana law required the
court to examine the pleadings to see whether indemnity would be
required if the plaintiff proved any set of facts alleged in his pleadings.
If the plaintiff alleged a set of facts which would require indemnity if
proved, the indemnitor was obliged to defend. If no set of facts which
would require indemnity were alleged, no defense was owed. According
to the Sullen court, Louisiana law was clear, and Stephens was in error
because it failed to consider controlling Louisiana cases. Furthermore,
other controlling cases had been decided since Stephens which were
contrary to Stephens. As the court observed:
Whether a party is obliged to tender a defense to another party
depends entirely upon the allegations in the precipitating plead-
ings. American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La.
251, 230 So. 2d 253 (1969); Young Oil Co. of Louisiana, Inc.
v. Durbin, 412 So. 2d 620 (La. App. 1982); Sullivan v. Hooker
Chemical Co., 370 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 1979); Pearson v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 345 So. 2d 123 (La. App.
1977). In determining whether an indemnitor or an insurer is
obligated to defend an indemnitee or insured under the terms
of an indemnity or insurance contract, the Louisiana courts look
exclusively to the pleadings in light of the contract provisions;
the ultimate outcome of the case has no effect upon the duty
to defend. Young Oil Co. v. Durbin; West Brothers of DeRidder,
La. Inc. v. Morgan Roofing Co., Inc., 376 So. 2d 345 (La.
App. 1979); Sullivan v. Hooker Chemical Co. In seeking cost
and fee reimbursement Chevron is arguing its entitlement to a
defense.
... [W]e conclude that unless the contract of indemnity spe-
cifically provides for costs of defense as a separate item of
indemnification, the indemnitor has no obligation to defend if
the petition alleges facts which, if proven, would establish lia-
bility of the indemnitee but preclude coverage under the in-
demnity agreement. 34
After applying Louisiana law to the facts of the case, the court deter-
mined that Chevron was not entitled to recover costs and attorneys'
fees, because Sullen's complaint was based solely on allegations of
34. 750 F.2d at 433-34.
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Chevron's negligence which, if proved, would have precluded coverage
under the indemnity agreement.
Sullen appeared to settle the issue for a while. When the issue arose
in Frazier v. Columbia Gas Development Corp.,3" the district court turned
to the opinion in Sullen and followed it. According to the district court,
the only claims against Columbia Gas were based on allegations of
Columbia's own negligence and Columbia could not be indemnified for
its own negligence. Since Columbia was not entitled to indemnity on
the only basis on which it could be held liable, Consolidated (the
indemnitor) was not required to defend it.
Durant v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.3 6 also followed Sullen. Durant, an
employee of Elliott, was injured on one of Chevron's drilling platforms.
He sued Chevron alleging that Chevron was liable under both negligence
and strict liability law. Chevron filed a third party indemnity demand
against Elliott based upon an agreement in which Elliott was to defend
and indemnify Chevron against any contract related injury claims brought
by Elliott's employees.17 After considering the Louisiana Oilfield In-
demnity Act, the court found that Chevron would not be entitled to
indemnity for liability based on either negligence or strict liability. Since
the pleadings only alleged bases for liability which would exclude in-
demnity coverage, the court following Sullen found that Elliott had no
duty to defend Chevron.
At first glance, Wilson v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.3" appears to
depart from the pleading determinative rule set out in Sullen, but as a
footnote indicates, the court was aware of Sullen and thought it was
following it. 9 McDermott contracted with Exxon to construct a fixed
platform in the Gulf. McDermott then contracted with J.R.F. Enterprises
to assist in the construction. Wilson, an employee of J.R.F., was injured
35. 605 F. Supp. 200 (W.D. La. 1985).
36. 613 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. La. 1985).
37. The indemnity clause provided:
"[Elliott] agrees to defend and hold [Chevron] indemnified and harmless from
and against any loss, expense claim or demand for:
a) Injury to or death of [Elliott's] employees or for damage to or loss of
[Elliott's] property in any way arising out of or connected with the performance
by [Elliott] or services hereunder; and
b) Injury to, or death of, third persons or the employees of [Chevron] or for
damage to or loss of property of [Chevron] or of third persons, in any way
arising out of or connected with the performance by [Elliott] of services her-
eunder, unless caused solely by the negligence of [Chevron]; provided that if
such injury, death, damage or loss is caused by the joint or concurrent negligence
of [Elliott] and [Chevron], each shall be liable for one-half of the loss, expense,
claim or demand resulting therefrom."
613 F. Supp. at 1190-91.
38. 616 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. La. 1985).
39. 616 F. Supp. at 1305 n.2.
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while working on the platform. The agreement between McDermott and
J.R.F. contained reciprocal indemnity provisions providing that each
party would defend and hold the other party harmless from any claims
brought against the other by one of its employees, regardless of fault.4 0
On first consideration of the issue, the district court found that the
Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act rendered these clauses totally void.
Upon reconsideration, the court held that the clauses were only invalid
to the extent that they required defense and indemnity for the indem-
nitee's own negligence. They remained in effect to the extent that they
provided for defense and indemnity for claims not occasioned by the
indemnitee's own fault. The court observed, "[als a practical matter,
this means only that McDermott will be entitled to its costs of defense
for [sic] J.R.F. Enterprises if the trier of fact finds that McDermott
was not negligent or otherwise at fault." 4  The court made clear its
awareness of Sullen by quoting the following language from that opinion:
'[U]nless the contract of indemnity specifically provides for costs of
defense as a separate item of indemnification, the indemnitor has no
obligation to defend if the petition alleges facts, which, if proven, would
establish liability of the indemnitee but preclude coverage under the
indemnity agreement." '' 42 The court then avoided the pleading rule set
out in Sullen by finding that the agreement provided for defense costs
as a separate item of indemnification when it stated that the
"[s]ubcontractor shall be obligated to bear the expense of the investi-
gations and defenses of all claims or demands or causes of action against
which McDermott is indemnified herein, and all lawsuits and adminis-
trative proceedings arising therefrom."'" The court interpreted this pro-
vision as entitling McDermott to the costs of its defense if it were
exonerated from all fault. This statement, however, disregards the thrust
of Sullen which is that the obligation to defend is determined without
regard to the outcome unless the contract specifically states that the
outcome will determine liability for defense costs. This provision merely
stated that McDermott was entitled to defense if the claim was one for
which it could be indemnified. As the court correctly pointed out,
McDermott was not entitled to indemnification for its own fault. Thus
under Sullen, if the pleadings alleged that McDermott was at fault,
McDermott was not entitled to indemnity, and under the agreement if
40. The agreement provided: .'[J.R.F] shall be obligated to bear the expense of the
investigations and defenses of all claims or demands or causes of action against which
McDermott is indemnified herein,- and all lawsuits and administrative proceedings arising
therefrom .... "' 616 F. Supp. at 1305 n.2 (emphasis by the court).
41. 616 F. Supp. at 1305.
42. 616 F. Supp. at 1305 n.2 (emphasis by the court).
43. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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McDermott was not entitled to indemnity, it could not be entitled to
a defense.
The western district continued to follow both the letter and the
spirit of Sullen in Moser v. Aminoil, U.S.A., Inc." Moser, an employee
of Sweco, was injured while working on a platform owned by Aminoil.
He sued Aminoil alleging negligence. The district court found that the
Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act invalidated the indemnity agreement
between Aminoil and Sweco. 41 Nevertheless, Aminoil, citing Home In-
surance Co. v. Garber Industries,46 argued that even if it was not entitled
to indemnity, it was entitled to reimbursement of defense costs if it
were ultimately found free of negligence. The district court disagreed
with Aminoil's reliance on Garber, observing that the district court in
Garber had not had the benefit of the fifth circuit's opinion in Sullen.
The court then applied Sullen, stating:
In the instant case, Moser's complaint is based on the alleged
concurrent negligence of Aminoil, Sweco and Global Marine.
Section 2780 will not permit Sweco to defend or indemnify
Aminoil for its concurrent negligence. Thus, as the plaintiff's
precipitating pleadings do not allege facts which, if proven,
would be properly covered by the indemnity agreement, the claim
for contractual indemnity must fall in toto.
47
The western district also followed Sullen in Heath v. Superior Oil
Co. 48 Heath, an employee of Wire-Tech Services, was injured while
working on a fixed platform owned by Superior Oil. When Heath sued
Superior alleging concurrent negligence on the part of Superior and
Wire-Tech, Superior sought contractual indemnity and defense from
Wire-Tech under an indemnity agreement which provided indemnity to
Superior for losses caused by its sole or concurrent negligence.4 9 The
court found that the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act invalidated the
indemnity agreement and denied the claim for defense, since Heath's
pleadings alleged concurrent negligence on the parts of Superior and
44. 618 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. La. 1985).
45. The indemnity agreement provided:
"[Sweco] shall hold harmless, defend and indemnify [Aminoil] from and
against all losses, damages, demands, claims, suits, and other liabilities, including
counsel fees and other expenses of litigation, arising out of or related to services
performed by [Sweco], its agents, or employees, or subcontractors; unless such
liabilities or losses result from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of
[Aminoill, its agents, or employees."
618 F. Supp. at 778.
46. 588 F. Supp. 1218 (W.D. La. 1984).
47. 618 F. Supp. at 781.
48. 617 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. La. 1985).
49. 617 F. Supp. at 34-35.
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Wire-Tech. In reaching this decision, the court relied on Moser, which
followed Sullen.
The fifth circuit considered the impact of the Louisiana Oilfield
Indemnity Act on the obligation to defend in Laird v. Shell Oil Co."
Laird was an employee of L & L Sandblasting, a contractor hired by
Shell to repaint one of its platforms. Laird was injured when a rope
on the platform broke. He sued Shell alleging negligence, and Shell filed
a third party indemnity and defense claim against L & L pursuant to
an agreement which required L & L to defend and indemnify Shell
against contract related personal injury claims which were not caused
solely by Shell's negligence." The jury found that Shell was not negligent.
The court applied Sullen and concluded that L & L had no duty to
defend, because the complaint alleged facts which, if proved, would
establish Shell's sole liability and preclude coverage under the agreement.
Since L & L had no duty to defend, it also had no duty to reimburse
the costs of defense. The Laird court recognized and distinguished Livings
v. Service Truck Lines of Texas, Inc.,52 which appears to conflict with
Sullen," on the ground that the agreement in Livings was not as limited
as the agreement in Sullen and pointed out that Sullen was consistent
with another Louisiana appellate case, Sullivan v. Hooker Chemical
Co.54
The effect of the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act on the obligation
to defend was discussed again in Alexander v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.55
Alexander, an employee of Champion Oil & Gas, was injured on a
platform owned by Chevron. Alexander sued Chevron alleging negligent
maintenance and supervision of the platform and strict liability. Chevron
filed a third party demand against Champion under an agreement in
which Champion agreed to defend and indemnify Chevron against con-
tract related personal injury claims brought by Champion employees. 6
50. 770 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1985).
51. The indemnity clause provided:
"[L & L agrees to] defend and indemnify Shell ... against all losses, claims,
suits, liability, and expense arising out of injury or death of persons (including
employees of Shell, [L & LI or any subcontractor) ... resulting from or in
connection with the performance of this order and not caused solely by Shell's
negligence without any contributory negligence or fault of [L & L] or any
subcontractor or their employees or agents."
770 F. 2d at 511.
52. 467 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
53. See discussion of Livings in text accompanying infra notes 64-65.
54. 370 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 376 So. 2d 500
(1979).
55. 623 F. Supp. 1462 (W.D. La. 1985).
56. The indemnity clause provided:
"Contractor (Champion] agrees to defend and hold Company [Chevron] in-
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Chamlion moved for summary judgment on the indemnity and defense
claim, arguing that the indemnity agreement was voided by the Louisiana
Oilfield Indemnity Act. Judge Veron described the current status of the
defense issue when he observed:
While it is clear that no defense or indemnity is owed where
the indemnitee is at least partially at fault, the issue upon which
the federal district courts of Louisiana have become divided is
essentially whether or not the OAIA [Louisiana Oilfield Anti-
Indemnity Act] prohibits the indemnitor from being obliged to
pay the costs of defense if the indemnitee is ultimately found
free from fault by the trier of fact. In Aucoin v. Pelham Marine,
Inc., 593 F.Supp. 770 (W.D.La.1984), Senior District Judge
Hunter held that if the OAIA is applicable, not only are the
indemnity provisions of the contract invalidated, but any duty
to defend is also nullified and the indemnitor owes no duty to
defend the indemnitee. Id. at 776-77. This Court has subse-
quently followed and embellished this rationale in the case of
Moser v. Aminoil, U.S.A., Inc., 618 F.Supp. 774 (W.D.La.1985).
Other federal district courts, however, have ruled in accordance
with Home Insurance Co. v. Garber Industries, Inc., 588 F.Supp.
1218 (W.D.La.1984), wherein Judge Shaw held that the OAIA
nullified the indemnity agreements to the extent that they pur-
ported to require the indemnitors to indemnify and defend the
indemnitees against the consequences of the indemnitees' own
negligence, but that the indemnitees would yet be entitled to
the costs of defense if the jury subsequently found that the
indemnitees were not negligent and were free from fault. Id. at
1222-23. Under this line of reasoning, a factual question as to
the existence or absence of Chevron's sole or concurrent neg-
ligence or fault would preclude summary judgment in the case
at bar. 7
demnified and harmless from and against any loss, expense, claim or demand
for:
(a) injury to or death of Contractor's employees, or for damage to or loss of
Contractor's property in any way arising out of or connected with the per-
formance of Contractor of services hereunder; and
(b) injury to or death of third persons or the employees of Company, or for
damage to or loss of property by Company or of third persons in any way
arising out of or connected with the services by Contractor of services hereunder,
unless caused solely by the negligence of Company; provided that if such injury,
death, damage or loss is caused by the joint or concurrent negligence of Con-
tractor and Company, each shall be liable for one-half of the loss, expense,
claim or demand resulting therefrom.
623 F. Supp. at 1464.
57. 623 F. Supp. at 1465.
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Like the court in Moser, Judge Veron correctly resolved the 'oblem
by pointing out that Garber was decided without the benefit of Sullen
and Laird, and thus was an incorrect statement of the law. If the
Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act nullifies any obligation which might
exist in a case to indemnify the indemnitee, it also nullifies any obligation
in the case to defend the indemnitee1 s Any duty which Champion owed
to indemnify Chevron was nullified, so Champion had no duty to defend
Chevron and was entitled to summary judgment.
While the western district was considering the effect of Sullen and
Laird and the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act in Alexander, the eastern
district was wrestling with the same problem in Jackson v. Tenneco Oil
Co.5 9 Unfortunately, the Jackson court reached a different conclusion
than the Alexander court, and the exact status of the law remained
unclear. Jackson, an employee of Halliburton, was injured while working
on a platform owned by Tenneco. Jackson alleged that his injuries were
caused by the concurrent negligence of Halliburton, Bootstrap and Ten-
neco. The claims against Halliburton were dismissed by summary judg-
ment, and Tenneco filed a third party demand against Halliburton for
indemnity and defense. The contract between Halliburton and Tenneco
contained reciprocal indemnity clauses requiring each party to assume
full responsibility for claims of its employees regardless of who was at
fault."' Halliburton moved for summary dismissal of the indemnity and
58. Id.
59. 623 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. La. 1985).
60. The indemnity agreement provided:
"A. [Tenneco] agrees to defend, indemnify and hold [Halliburton], its sub-
sidiary and affiliate companies, their agents, employees, directors, officers, serv-
ants, and insurers, harmless from and against any and all losses, claims, demands,
liabilities or causes of action of every kind and character, in favor of any
person or party, for injury to or illness or death of any employee of [Tenneco]
or its joint interest owners, which injury, illness or death arises out of or is
incident to the work performed under this Contract, and regardless of the cause
of such injury, illness or death, even though caused in whole or in part by a
pre-existing defect, indemnitees' negligence or strict liability, or other legal fault
of indemnitees. [Tennecol shall fully defend any such claim, demand or suit as
[sicl its sole expense, even if the same is groundless.
"This indemnity shall be limited to the extent necessary for compliance with
applicable State and Federal laws.
"B. [Halliburton] agrees to defend, indemnify and hold [Tennecol, its joint
interest owners, its subsidiary and affiliate companies, their agents, employees,
directors, officers, servants, and insurers, harmless from and against any and
all losses, claims, demands, liabilities or causes of action of every kind and
character in favor of any person or party, for injury to or illness or death of
any employee of [Halliburton] or any employee of subcontractors of [Halli-
burton], which injury, illness or death arises out of or is incident to the work
performed under this Contract, and regardless of the cause of such injury,
OBLIGATION TO DEFEND
defense, claim on the ground that the indemnity agreement was invalidated
by the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act.
On original hearing, the court found the indemnity agreement invalid
insofar as it provided for indemnity and defense for Tenneco's own
negligence. Nevertheless, if Tenneco were completely exonerated of fault
at trial, it would be free to pursue its claim for defense costs against
Halliburton.
The court then decided to reconsider its ruling in light of Sullen
and Laird."' On reconsideration, the court found that Sullen required
it to examine the pleadings and the terms of the agreement to determine
whether the contract separated the obligation to defend from the ob-
ligation to indemnify and if not, whether the pleadings alleged facts
which, if proved, would exclude indemnity and, therefore, defense. The
court then found that the Tenneco-Halliburton contract did not contain
a separate obligation to defend. Nevertheless, the court found that the
pleadings did not preclude coverage under the terms found on the face
of the contract. Therefore, according to the court, the contract did not
preclude defense. After applying Sullen in isolation, the court applied
the Louisiana Oilfield. Indemnity Act and held that, insofar as the
contract allowed defense where Tenneco was negligent, the contract was
void. Thus, the court said that while Tenneco could not enforce the
agreement by requiring Halliburton to defend it, Tenneco could assert
its claim for costs of defense and attorneys' fees if it were ultimately
found free of fault.
With all due respect, this analysis flies in the face of the rationale
behind Sullen and Laird. Under Sullen and Laird, the obligation to
defend depends upon whether the pleadings allege facts which, if proved,
would preclude indemnity under the contract. If the Louisiana Oilfield
Indemnity Act invalidates that part of the contract which would allow
indemnity and therefore defense, then that provision of the contract is
treated as if it had never existed. Thus, the provision of the contract
which would prevent exclusion from coverage by proof of the alleged
facts is without effect, and proof of the alleged facts excludes coverage.
Once proof of the alleged facts excludes coverage, Sullen and Laird, as
well as the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act, relieve the indemnitor of
the obligation to defend and the obligation to reimburse defense costs.
The pleadings, not the outcome of the case, control the obligation to
defend and, therefore, the obligation to pay defense costs.
illness or death, even though caused in whole or in party [sic) by a pre-existing
defect, indemnitees' negligence or strict liability, or other legal fault of indem-
nitees. [Halliburton] shall fully defend any such claim, demand or suit at its
sole expense, even if the same is groundless."
623 F. Supp. at 1454.
61. 623 F. Supp. at 1459.
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The Fourth Period
Despite the existence of Sullen and Laird, oil companies continued
to argue that, even if they were not entitled to indemnity from their
contractors, they were entitled to recover the costs of successfully de-
fending negligence claims brought by employees of the contractors. The
fourth period began when Chevron argued in Knapp v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc.6 1 that it was entitled to reimbursement of defense costs because it
had been found free of fault. 6 The fifth circuit quickly rejected Chev-
ron's argument and continued to follow Sullen. In continuing to rely
upon its analysis in Sullen, the court recognized that Sullen's holding
conflicted with Livings v. Service Truck Lines of Texas, Inc., but the
court declined to follow Livings which, "without citation of authority
or discussion, deferred the determination of a party's right to a defense
until after that party's 'negligence or fault' has been 'fully explored. ' ' '"
The court noted further that, "Livings conflicts with Sullivan v. Hooker
Chemical Co. authored by Justice Lemmon of the Louisiana Supreme
Court, while a member of a Louisiana intermediate appellate court. '65
Even after Knapp, the issue did not die. One by one, Louisiana
cases were discovered which apparently did not apply the standard which
Sullen had said was clearly the law in Louisiana. Some were decided
before Sullen, and others were decided after it.
In Doucet v. Gulf Oil Corp.,66 the fifth circuit faced the same
situation that was at issue in Alexander and Jackson. Doucet, an em-
ployee of Danos, was injured while working on a platform owned by
Gulf. Danos had contracted with Gulf to provide general oil field labor
and other services. When Doucet sued Gulf, Gulf tendered its defense
to Danos under their contract which required Danos to indemnify Gulf
'against all costs, expenses, and attorney's fees incurred by Gulf in
the defense of . . .causes of action ...on account of personal injuries
... whether arising out of negligence on the part of Gulf or otherwise,
including ... any theory of strict liability, . . . arising out of the work
performed by [Danos].' 6 7 Danos refused to defend, and the district
court originally granted Gulf's demand for contractual indemnity and
62. 781 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1986).
63. Knapp, an employee of PBW, was injured while painting a platform owned by
Chevron. He sued Chevron, claiming that Chevron had been negligent in its maintenance
of the platform. Chevron filed a third party demand against PBW under a contract in
which PBW agreed to defend and indemnify Chevron against contract related personal
injury claims brought by PBW employees. After a trial, the district court found Chevron
to be free of negligence or fault.
64. 781 F.2d at 1128 (citation omitted).
65. Id. (citation omitted).
66. 783 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1986).
67. 783 F.2d at 521.
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defense. The district court then reversed itself and dismissed the third
party complaint. On appeal, the fifth circuit found that, under Sullen,
Knapp, and the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act, an indemnitee is not
entitled to defense where the allegations are based upon negligence or
strict liability. Since Doucet's claims were based upon allegations of
Gulf's negligence and strict liability, Gulf was not entitled to the costs
of defense.
Even the decision in Doucet did not settle the issue. The criticism
of Sullen came to a head in Waller v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.," when
Judge Parker refused to read Sullen, Knapp, and Doucet to relieve an
indemnitor of the obligation to pay the costs of defense if the indemnitee
is ultimately found free of fault. According to Judge Parker, such a
result "stands the law of indemnity upon its head." ' 69 The opinions in
Sullen, Knapp, and Doucet, wrote Parker, "simply cannot stand for
the proposition ... because that court [the fifth circuit] would never
accept such a bizarre notion. Moreover, those decisions were rendered
without consideration of the Harper and Rodriguez cases and in two
of them, without consideration of the Livings decision as well." 7
Waller, an employee of Engineered Mechnical Services (EMS), was
injured on a platform owned by Chevron. He sued Chevron alleging
negligence and strict liability. Chevron filed a third party demand for
defense and indemnity against EMS and its insurer, Maryland Casualty,
based on an agreement in which EMS agreed to defend and indemnify
Shell against contract related personal injury claims brought by EMS
employees." In a motion for summary judgment, Maryland argued that
68. 630 F. Supp. 313 (M.D. La. 1986).
69. 630 F. Supp. at 315.
70. Id. at 318 (citing Harper v. Brown & Root, Inc., 383 So. 2d 1079 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1980)(see text accompanying infra notes 84-87), and Rodriguez v. Illinois Cent.
Gulf R.R. Co., 395 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981)(see text accompanying infra
notes 88-89)).
71. The indemnity clause provided:
"[EMS] agrees to defend and hold [Chevron] indemnified and harmless from
and against any loss, expense, claim or demand for:
"(a) Injury to or death of IEMS'sl employees or for damage to or loss of
[EMS's] property in any way arising out of or connected with the performance
by [EMS] of services hereunder; and
"(b) Injury to, or death of third persons or the employees of [Chevron), or
for damage to or loss of property of [Chevron] or of third persons, in any
way arising out of or connected with the performance by [EMS] of services
hereunder, unless caused solely by the negligence of [Chevron]; provided that
if such injury, death, damage or loss is caused by the joint or concurrent
negligence of [EMS] and [Chevronl, each shall be liable for one-half of the
loss, expense, claim, or demand resulting therefrom.
"[Chevron] shall have the right, at its option, to participate in the defense
of any such suit without relieving [EMSI of any obligation hereunder."
630 F. Supp. at 314-15.
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the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act rendered the agreement between
EMS and Chevron void and thus it had no duty to defend or indemnify
Chevron.
Judge Parker rejected this argument. First he reached the conclusion
that the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act leaves standing that part of
the agreement which provided Chevron with indemnity if it were not
at fault. Then he stated that there is a vast difference between a liability
insurance policy which provides for indemnity for the fault of the insured
and an indemnity contract such as the one at issue, which provided
indemnity only where the indemnitee is not at fault. Furthermore, he
noted that liability insurance policies contain clauses requiring the in-
surance company to provide a defense even if the claims made against
the insured are untrue, unless exclusions clearly negate coverage under
the policy. Thus, according to Judge Parker, it is appropriate to look
to the pleadings and the terms of the policy to determine the obligation
to defend in an insurance case, since the insurer has agreed to defend
even if the claims are untrue. In contrast, Judge Parker claimed:
In the case of indemnity, it is the absence of fault of the
indemnitee which is the essence of the agreement. Unless the
indemnitee can demand indemnity for the cost of establishing
its freedom from fault, it can never enforce its agreement. All
plaintiffs will always allege the fault of the indemnitee (otherwise
they would not be in court). To allow mere allegations of fault
made by a third party to vitiate an otherwise perfectly valid
agreement violates the contract, logic and common sense."
Judge Parker's distinctions are not necessarily valid. As many of
the cases discussed above indicate, contracts worded like the one in
Waller have been used, in the absence of some statute invalidating them,
to require an indemnitor to indemnify an indemnitee for judgments
which are based upon a finding of negligence or fault on the part of
the indemnitee. Thus, indemnity agreements are not necessarily based
upon the absence of fault on the part of the indemnitee. Furthermore,
plaintiffs will at times sue the indemnitee without claiming that the
indemnitee himself has been negligent, since defendants are sometimes
held liable without fault-as in the case of vicarious liability for others
and absolute liability for ultrahazardous activities. Particularly in cases
where indemnitees have sought indemnity even for accidents caused by
their own sole or concurrent negligence, the purpose behind the indemnity
agreement is not all that different from the purpose behind a liability
insurance contract. Knowing that some of the activities involved in its
industry can be very hazardous, the indemnitee seeks to spread the risks
72. Id. at 316 (emphasis by the court).
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by contracting out some of the hazardous activity to contractors and
subcontractors and requiring them to assume some of the risks. To
make sure that the risks are spread, the indemnitee requires the contractor
or subcontractor to agree to an indemnity clause which will assure that
the indemnitee will be relieved of liability if the accidents which will
potentially result from the contracted activity actually occur. The refusal
of Louisiana courts to interpret indemnity contracts to require indemnity
for the indemnitee's own negligence and the enactment of the Louisiana
Oilfield Indemnity Act by the Louisiana Legislature are statements of
policy that the indemnitees have not necessarily chosen the best or fairest
way to spread the risk. The fifth circuit opinions do not stand the law
of indemnity on its head. They mirror the policy of the Louisiana courts
and legislature that it is unfair to the contractors and subcontractors
to expect them to take the risk of defending and paying claims based
on accidents that may have been caused by the indemnitee's fault. They
leave intact the main valid purpose of indemnity agreements-to protect
the indemnitee from vicarious liability based on the fault of the in-
demnitor. Since this valid use of indemnity agreements is left standing,
neither the result nor the rationale of Sullen, Knapp, and Doucet are
contrary to "contract, logic and common sense," and they do require
courts to reach the opposite result from the one reached by Judge
Parker.
It would not be accurate to say that the rationale and results reached
in Sullen, Knapp, and Doucet are unquestionably correct. As the fifth
circuit itself admitted in Knapp, there are Louisiana appellate court
decisions which support the fifth circuit's position and decisions which
contradict it. Recently, the fifth circuit followed Sullen, Knapp, and
Doucet again in Meloy v. Conoco, Inc.,7 but upon rehearing the court
decided that the conflicting decisions of lower Louisiana courts merited
withdrawal of its opinion and certification of the issue to the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
HISTORY OF THE OBLIGATION TO DEFEND IN STATE COURT
As early as 1836, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
awarding attorneys' fees to an indemnitee under an indemnity contract.
7 4
Eleven years later in Berry v. Slocomb, 7 the court said: "It is quite
clear that where one party thus agrees to hold another harmless, the
latter may recover the cost and charges reasonably disbursed in con-
sequence of a suit against him.' 76
73. 784 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1986), withdrawn, 792 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1986).
74. See Dezier v. Bougnon, 9 La. 250 (1836).
75. 2 La. Ann. 993 (1847).
76. Id.
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Following Berry, the early Louisiana cases resemble the early federal
cases. They disposed of the obligation to defend with little discussion
and few citations. Although discussion was short or nonexistent, the
decisions in these cases also followed a pattern. As in the early federal
cases, the central question was whether the claim was covered by the
indemnity provisions of the contract, yet the ultimate outcome on the
liability issue had little effect upon the obligation to pay attorneys'
fees."
After more than a hundred years of deciding the defense issue with
little discussion, the first circuit shed a little light on how the obligation
should be determined in Pearson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. 7 1 Pearson, an employee of H. E. Wiese, Inc., a contractor of Shell
Oil, was injured while he was at one of Shell's plants. He sued Shell
and its insurer, Travelers, seeking tort damages, and in the alternative,
77. See New Orleans Great N. R. Co. v. S.T. Alcus & Co., 159 La. 36, 105 So.
91 (1925)(The plaintiff won his case against the indemnitee and the indemnitee was awarded
indemnity and attorneys' fees because the contract covered the claim.); Roberts v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 369 So. 2d 1114 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 890 (La.
1979)(Plaintiff sued the indemnitee claiming unsafe working conditions. The district court
said indemnity and defense were owed because the contract covered working conditions.
The court of appeals affirmed. No outcome on the liability issue was available because
the issue was decided on a summary motion.); Lee v. Allied Chem. Corp., 331 So. 2d
608 (La. App. Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 377 So. 2d 525 (1976)(Facts similar to Roberts,
but the trial court held that no indemnity or defense was owed. The appellate court
overturned, holding that the indemnitor did owe indemnity and defense because the contract
covered working conditions. No outcome on the liability issue was available because the
decision was rendered on a summary judgment motion.); Kirkland v. Western Elec. Co.,
296 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974)(Plaintiff sued indemnitee claiming negligence
on the part of one of the indemnitor's employees. The suit against the indemnitee was
dismissed and thus no outcome on the liability issue was available. The court nevertheless
found that the contract covered the claim and awarded attorneys' fees.).; Dixie Mach.
Welding & Metal Works v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 285 So. 2d 808 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 288 So. 2d 644 (1974)(Plaintiff sued the indemnitee and lost. The court
denied attorneys' fees because the contract did not cover the claim.); Treme v. American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 260 So. 2d 41 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 So. 2d 40
(1972)(Plaintiff sued the indemnitee alleging negligence and lost. Court found that the
claim was covered by the contract and awarded attorneys' fees.); Jennings v. Ralston
Purina Co., 201 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert denied, 203 So. 2d 554 (1967)(Plaintiff's
suit was based on indemnitee negligence and attorneys' fees were awarded because the
contract covered indemnitee negligence.); Hospital Serv. Dist. No. I v. Delta Gas, Inc.,
171 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 173 So. 2d 540 (1965)(No outcome was
available because the suit was settled. Attorneys' fees were awarded because the claim
was based in part upon allegations of indemnitor negligence which was covered by the
contract.); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Palmer, 18 La. App. 142, 137 So. 545 (2d Cir.
1931)(The indemnitee was sued on an appeal bond. The indemnitor defended the indemnitee
and they lost. The indemnitee appealed and won. The court awarded the indemnitee
attorneys' fees.).
78. 345 So. 2d 123 (La. App. ist Cir.), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 255 (1977).
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he sought worker's compensation benefits from his employer's insurer.
Later he amended his petition to add as a defendant an employee of
Shell who he alleged negligently caused the accident. Travelers claimed
that Pearson was contributorily negligent and filed a third party claim
against Wiese claiming that the contractor had a duty to defend Shell
and its employees under the terms of the agreement. 9 The contractor
claimed that it had no duty to defend where the negligence of a Shell
employee was alleged to be the sole cause of the injury.
The trial court dismissed Pearson's claims. In determining that the
contractor was not obligated to defend Shell or its employees, the court
observed: "The suit filed by Pearson was based solely on the negligence
of Champine, an employee of Shell. Under the terms of the contract
there is no duty to defend where the suit is based solely on the negligence
of Shell or its employees." 80 This language indicates that the court
examined the terms of the contract and the pleadings in determining
the duty to defend. There is no indication that the outcome of the trial
had any effect upon the determination of the obligation to defend.
The fourth circuit joined the first circuit in applying a pleading
approach to the determination of the obligation to defend in Sullivan
v. Hooker Chemical Co. 81 Sullivan, an employee of Atlas Erection Co.,
was injured on the premises of Hooker Chemical's plant when the truck
in which he was riding was struck by another truck. Sullivan claimed
that the accident was caused by the negligence of the other driver in
failing to stop and the negligence of Hooker and Giambelluca (another
contractor) in failing to provide warnings at a blind corner. Hooker
demanded that Atlas provide indemnity to it and take over its defense
79. The agreement provided in pertinent part:
"Wiese shall defend and indemnify Shell, its employees and agents against
all claims of and liability to third parties (including, without limitation, all
employees of Shell or Wiese and all of their subcontractors and their employees)
for injury to or death of persons or loss of or damage to property arising ous
of or in connection with the performance of this contract, except where such
injury, death, loss, or damage has resulted from the negligence of Shell without
negligence or fault on the part of Wiese or any of their subcontractors, in
which case this clause shall not apply, and further provided that where such
injury, death, loss, or damage has resulted from the contributory negligence of
Shell, Wiese's responsibility for that portion of the claim attributable to Shell
shall be limited to $250,000 each person and $500,000 each occurrence for bodily
injury and property damage limits of $100,000 each accident and $100,000 ag-
gregate. Wiese shall defend all suits brought upon such claims and pay all costs
and expenses incidental thereof, but Shell shall have the right, at its option, to
participate in the defense of any such suit, without relieving Wiese of any
obligations hereunder."
345 So. 2d at 128-29.
80. 345 So. 2d at 128-29.
81. 370 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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under the terms of the indemnity agreement between them.8 2, Atlas refused
and Hooker filed a third party demand against Atlas.
After a trial on the merits, the court found that the other driver
was the only negligent defendant, but denied recovery because it also
found Sullivan contributorily negligent. Hooker admitted that the in-
demnity agreement did not require Atlas to indemnify Hooker for its
own negligence, but it argued that the accident was caused by the
negligence of one or more of Atlas' employees and, thus, it could only
be vicariously liable. Since it could only be vicariously liable, Hooker
argued, Atlas owed it a defense. The court, however, rejected Hooker's
reasoning, which was grounded on the ultimate outcome of the case,
stating:
Plaintiff's petition alleged Hooker was liable on the basis of
its independent negligence and of its negligence or responsibility
in relation to Giambelluca's contractual operations. There was
no allegation of liability asserted against Hooker in relation to
Atlas' contractual operations. Thus, unless the pleadings were
expanded, Hooker could only have been found liable on the
basis of its own negligence or that of Giambelluca.
... The contract terms provided for indemnity for Hooker's
liability for Atlas' negligence, but not for Hooker's own neg-
ligence or for Hooker's liability for negligence of a third party.
Under these circumstances neither indemnity nor defense is owed
by Atlas. 3
This language clearly indicates a rejection of the ultimate outcome
approach and a reliance upon the pleading approach.
The Louisiana courts, however, have been far from consistent in
their choice of the pleading approach over the outcome approach. The
third circuit appears to have applied the outcome approach in Harper
v. Brown & Root, Inc. " Harper sued his employer (Brown & Root),
the utility company with which his employer had contracted (CLECO),
and others for the value of tools which had mysteriously disappeared
while he was working on the premises of the utility company. The utility
company filed a third party defense and indemnity demand against Brown
& Root. The trial court dismissed Harper's claim and ordered Brown
& Root to pay the utility company's costs and attorneys' fees. On
appeal, Brown & Root argued that it should not have to pay for the
utility company's attorneys' fees, because the utility company was a
82. 370 So. 2d at 676.
83. 370 So. 2d at 677.
84. 383 So. 2d 1079 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 391 So. 2d 1170
(1980).
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defendant based on its own alleged negligence, and the indemnity contract
did not purport to indemnify the utility company for its own negligence.
In answering this argument, the court said:
We concede that absent an express provision indemnifying an
indemnitee against losses resulting from his own negligence in-
demnification will not be allowed if the cause of injury or loss
sustained is shown to result from the indemnitee's own negligent
act of commission or omission. We likewise concede that the
contract of indemnity in this case did not contain a provision
indemnifying CLECO against losses resulting through its own
negligent acts. However, even assuming arguendo, that the al-
legations of plaintiff's petition indicate that CLECO was joined
as a party defendant solely on the basis of its own alleged
negligence this circumstance does not deprive CLECO of its
contractual right of indemnity if it is otherwise shown to be
entitled thereto. In matters of indemnity the allegations of a
claimant's pleadings, as to the cause of injury, are not deter-
minative of an indemnitee's right to indemnification. Rather,
whether or not indemnification should be allowed can be de-
termined only after liability is fixed.85
Although the quoted material appears to apply the outcome approach
to the obligation to defend, this is not necessarily the case. The quote
says that the right to indemnification can be determined only after
liability is fixed. In Harper, unlike Pearson and Sullivan, the attorneys'
fees themselves were specifically mentioned as an object of indemnifi-
cation in the agreement; recovery of attorneys' fees was not simply a
measure of damages for refusing to fulfill an obligation to defend.6
Thus, the contract in Harper specifically provided for recovery of the
costs of defense as a separate item of indemnification, and as Sullen
observed, in such a case the indemnitor may be required to pay the
attorneys' fees even though it would not be required to pay any judgment
that might ultimately be rendered against the indemnitee. Furthermore,
85. 383 So. 2d at 1082-83 (citations omitted).
86. The indemnity provisions provided:
"Contractor shall defend and indemnify and save Purchaser and the Consulting
Engineers harmless from any and all claims, losses, damages, costs and expenses,
including attorney's fees, arising or alleged to arise from personal injuries,
including death, or damage to property, including the loss of use thereof, and
resulting from, arising out of or in connection with the WORK or alleged to
result from or arise out of or in connection with the WORK, including, without
limitation, all liability imposed by virtue of any law designed to protect persons
employed at the WORK site."
383 So. 2d at 1082. Compare the contract terms in Pearson, supra note 79, and the
discussion of the indemnity contract in Sullivan, 370 So. 2d at 376-77.
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the Harper contract required the utility company to pay any attorneys'
fees resulting from claims of alleged contract related injuries, which
underscores the correctness of the court's result under the terms of this
contract. The 'difference in the contract in Harper from the contracts
in Pearson and Sullivan is emphasized by the fact that CLECO was
not only allowed to recover the costs of the original defense, but it was
also granted a $500.00 increase for prosecution of the appeal to enforce
its right to indemnification. Generally, an indemnitee is not allowed to
recover the costs of enforcing its right to indemnity."7
While there may be some justification for other circuits failing to
follow the first circuit cases which rely on the pleading approach, the
first circuit itself appears to have been inconsistent in following their
own decisions. In Rodriquez v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co.," the
driver of a log truck employed by a paper company sued the railroad
for injuries caused when a train hit the truck. he was driving as it
crossed the tracks. The railroad filed a third party claim against the
paper company seeking attorneys' fees and indemnity or contribution
under the terms of an indemnity agreement in which the paper company
agreed "to indemnify the railroad company for damages and attorneys'
fees for any injury or property damage which occurred at the crossing
and which was not caused by the sole fault of the railroad."8' 9 The trial
court found that the railroad was negligent and awarded the driver
damages. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment, finding that the
driver's contributory negligence barred his recovery. The paper company
argued that the agreement was applicable only if it was found to be
negligent. The court, however, found that under the terms of the agree-
ment, a claim was covered unless the accident was caused solely by the
negligence of the railroad; who the other negligent party was did not
seem to matter so long as the railroad's negligence was not the sole
cause of the accident.
It appears that this case diverges from the pleading approach used
in Pearson and Sullivan, but it is possible that the court reached a
different conclusion because attorneys' fees were a specific and separate
object of indemnification. It is also possible that the language of the
contract itself forced the court to wait until the outcome of the case
to determine who was responsible for the attorneys' fees. The contract
language is not quoted in the opinion.
While Rodriquez may be consistent with the pleading approach, the
first circuit clearly departed from that approach in Lewis v. Exxon
87. See Morris v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 445 So. 2d 1242, 1247 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 So. 2d 1345 (1984); cf. D'Albora v. Tulane University, 274 So. 2d 825,
831 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 So. 2d 504 (1973).
88. 395 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1981).
89. 395 So. 2d at 1371.
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Corp.90 Lewis, an employee of H. E. Wiese, Inc., was injured while
working at a plant owned by Exxon. Wiese contracted with Exxon to
convert an ethanol unit to an isopropanol unit. Lewis sued Exxon and
one of its employees alleging that their negligence caused his injuries..
Exxon then filed a third party defense and indemnity demand against
Wiese under a contract which required Wiese to defend and indemnify
Exxon for all contract related personal injury claims not caused by the
sole negligence of Exxon. 9' Lewis lost when the court found that Exxon
was his statutory employer and his claims were therefore barred by the
workers' compensation laws. The court also found that Lewis' injuries
were caused by the negligence of Exxon and its employee and that,
therefore, Exxon was not entitled to indemnity from Wiese. On appeal
Exxon argued that it was entitled to recover the costs of defending the
suit under the indemnity agreement, relying on-the proposition that the
indemnitor's duty to defend was similar to the insurer's duty to defend.
Therefore, according to Exxon, in determining the duty to defend all
the allegations in the petition should be assumed to be true. If after
making these assumptions, it appears that the indemnity agreement covers
the claims, then the indemnitor should have a duty to defend, regardless
of the ultimate outcome of the case. The court, however, rejected this
argument stating:
In the instant case it is clear from the language of the agreement
that the parties contemplated that the contractor was to reim-
burse the principal only after liability had been determined and
only in the event the liability did not result from the principal's
sole negligence. This situation cannot be equated with the sit-
uation arising under an insurance policy requiring the insurer
to defend lawsuits against the insured. Obviously, the parties
did not intend that where Exxon claims the accident was at least
concurrently caused by Wiese that Wiese, under the agreement,
is forced to side with Exxon and establish its own negligence.92
In rejecting Exxon's pleading argument, the court did not refer at all
to its past decisions in Pearson and Sullivan.
90. 417 So. 2d 1292 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1982), aff'd, 441 So. 2d 192 (1983).
91. The contract provided:
"[Wiese] shall defend, indemnify and save [Exxon], its officers, employees,
agents and representatives harmless from all claims for injuries to or death of
any and all persons, including without limitation, employees, agents and rep-
resentatives of [Wiese] or its subcontractors, arising out of or in connection
with or by reason of work done by [Wiese], its employees, agent, representatives,
or subcontractors under this contract, expressly excepting claims for injuries or
death caused by the sole negligence of (Exxon], its officers, employees, agents,
and representatives."
417 So. 2d at 1303.
92. 417 So. 2d at 1304.
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It is possible that the court denied defense costs because Exxon used
the insurance analogy and pleading approach in an atypical manner.
Usually, the indemnitor uses the pleading approach to argue that it
should not be required to defend an indemnitee who successfully defends
against allegations of his own negligence. Allowing a negligent indemnitee
to use the argument to require the indemnitor to defend him seems
unjust. Conversely, allowing a non-negligent indemnitor to use the plead-
ing approach to refuse to defend an allegedly negligent indemnitee who
is ultimately found free of negligence may further the ends of justice.
Thus, the court may have refused to apply the pleading approach in
this case because, under the peculiar circumstances, the pleading ap-
proach would have produced an unjust result. If the pleading approach
were applied to the Lewis case today, no unjust results would occur
because the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act would void that part of
the agreement providing for defense and indemnity in cases where Exxon
was concurrently negligent with another tortfeasor.
While the particular circumstances in Lewis may explain the rejection
of the pleading approach, the circumstances in Livings v. Service Truck
Lines of Texas, Inc.93 were quite different. Livings, an employee of M
& G Testing & Services, Inc., sued Service Truck Lines of Texas and
the Amoco Production Company alleging that the negligence of Service
and Amoco caused injuries which he sustained while testing a drill pipe
owned by Amoco. Service and Amoco then filed third party defense
and indemnity claims against M & G pursuant to the indemnity agree-
ments in their contracts. M & G then filed motions for summary
judgment alleging that the indemnity agreements were invalidated by the
Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act. The trial court granted M & G's
motion for summary judgment, and Service and Amoco appealed. On
appeal, Amoco argued that, even if the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity
Act was applicable, summary judgment was improper because the in-
demnitee must be found at fault before the indemnity agreement is
voided by the Act. Thus according to Amoco, if it were found free of
fault, it would still be entitled to a defense under the agreement. Citing
Home Insurance Co. v. Garber Industries,' the court accepted Amoco's
reasoning and found that summary judgment was improper since under
the Act and the indemnity agreement Amoco would be entitled to the
costs of defense if it were ultimately found free of negligence.
This case clearly follows the outcome approach. It does not, however,
distinguish or refer in any way to the Louisiana cases which use the
pleading approach, and it relies upon a federal case predating Sullen.
It is possible that this case was decided without the court's awareness
93. 467 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
94. 588 F. Supp. 1218 (W.D. La. 1984).
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of the pleading approach, and thus, the court may have inadvertently
neglected to consider it.
Summary of the State Court Activity
It appears that the Louisiana courts have approached the obligation
to defend on a case by case basis. Often the issue of the obligation to
defend has been treated in a cursory manner with little discussion and
no reference to other cases which have considered the obligation. At
other times, it appears that only one side of the argument was presented.
No case has discussed the issue in detail and compared the merits of
the outcome approach to the pleading approach. The result has been a
hodgepodge of apparently inconsistent opinions. Nevertheless, a close
examination of the recent decisions reveals a line of cases apparently
applying the pleading approach, followed by three cases apparently
rejecting the pleading approach in favor of an outcome approach. 5 It
may be possible to explain these three conflicting cases without rejecting
the pleading approach, since in two of them the contracts specifically
mentioned attorneys' fees as an object of indemnification, and in the
third case the pleading argument was presented in an unusual manner
that would have created an unjust result. On the other hand, the cases
could have reached inconsistent and irreconcilable results because of a
failure to find and consider other cases dealing with the same issue.
THE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE Two APPROACHES
Since the obligation to defend was not the major issue in most cases
until recently, it is not surprising that none of the state or federal cases
contains an analysis of the arguments supporting both approaches. A
few arguments can be gleaned from a careful reading of some of the
more detailed opinions, and other arguments appear sporadically without
much detail in some of the briefs. By combining and expanding upon
the skeletal arguments in both the opinions and the briefs, the arguments
on both sides can be compared. This process yields a strong case in
favor of the pleading approach, which is surprising in light of the
controversy that Sullen created.
Support for the Pleading Approach
The most basic argument in favor of the pleading approach is based
upon the meanings of the words "defend" and "indemnify." The word
"defend" means "to contest and endeavor to defeat a claim or demand
95. See Lewis, 417 So. 2d 1292; Rodriquez, 395 So. 2d 1369; Harper, 383 So. 2d
1079; Sullivan, 370 So. 2d 672; Pearson, 345 So. 2d 123.
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made against one in a court of justice."" The word "indemnify" means
"[t]o restore ... a loss, in whole or in part, by payment, repair, or
replacement" or "to make reimbursement to one of a loss already
incurred by him." 91 A "hold harmless agreement" is one which "re-
liev[es] the other party of responsibility. 9 8 Early indemnity agreements
tended to use the words "hold harmless," and courts found that these
words included the obligation to defend.9 Most modern agreements use
both the word "defend" and the word "indemnify." The definition of
the word "defend" contemplates more than simply a reimbursement of
money at the end of a case; it contemplates active efforts before judgment
to influence the outcome of a case. These active efforts include much
more than hiring counsel. In addition, they may include such things as
participating in the investigation of the claim and providing information
within one's peculiar knowledge which may assist in the defense. Since
the word "indemnify" contemplates reimbursement after a loss or cost
has been incurred or established, it would be redundant and meaningless
to use both the words "defend" and "indemnify," if the parties intended
only to require reimbursement of defense costs at the end of the suit.
Since the agreement to "defend" is an agreement to actively participate
in the process of defeating a claim, the obligation created by the agree-
ment must be satisfied by participation in the effort from the beginning
of the case. In order to fulfill this obligation from the beginning, a
party must know at the beginning of the case whether or not he has
a duty to defend.100 Even the proponents of the outcome approach admit
the logic, sense and practicality of this argument."" This argument is
also a primary reason to use the pleading approach in insurance cases.
The second general argument in favor of the pleading approach is
that insurance policies are in fact a form of indemnity agreement, and
thus, the pleading approach which has been accepted for a long time
in the insurance area should apply to general indemnity agreements as
well."' 2 This argument relies on the fact that liability insurance policies
96. Black's Law Dictionary, 377 (5th ed. 1979).
97. Id. at 692.
98. Id. at 658.
99. See, e.g., Pure Oil, 129 F. Supp. 194.
100. Original brief on behalf of third party defendants-appellants P.B.W., Inc., Na-
tional Security Fire & Casualty Co., and Integrity Ins. Co. at 18, Knapp v. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1980)(No. 84-3399).
101. Brief of amicus curiae Chevron U.S.A., Inc. in support of the suggestion of en
banc and consideration for rehearing of petitioner/appellant, Conoco, Inc., at 3, Meloy
v. Conoco, Inc., 784 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1986)(No. 84-4718); Memorandum of amicus
curiae, Exxon Corp., addressing those issues raised by the court in its order of May 5,
1986 at 2, id.
102. Original brief on behalf of third party defendants-appellants P.B.W., Inc., Na-
tional Security Fire & Casualty Co., and Integrity Ins. Co. at 18-19, Knapp.
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are agreements between the insurance company (the indemnitor) and the
insured (the indemnitee) in which the indemnitor agrees to defend and
indemnify the indemnitee against claims covered by the agreement (the
policy). In general indemnity agreements, the indemnitor also agrees to
defend and indemnify the indemnitee in situations covered by the agree-
ment. Both insurance policies and general indemnity agreements often
discuss one or more situations in which the parties agree that defense
and indemnity are not owed. Thus, under an insurance policy, the
insurance company does not agree to defend claims which clearly fall
within one of the stated exclusions; courts enforce this right of the
insurance company when it is applicable. Likewise, the indemnitee and
the indemnitor often agree upon a situation which the agreement will
not cover-usually the fault of the indemnitee. Just as the insurance
company has the right not to defend when from the pleadings and the
terms of the policy it appears that a case clearly falls within one of
the policy exclusions, the indemnitor should have the right not to defend
when from the pleadings and terms of the agreement it appears that a
case falls within the indemnitee fault exclusion of the indemnity agree-
ment. If the insurer has this right even though it agreed to defend
claims which might be groundless, surely the indemnitor who does not
agree to defend regardless of the truth of the allegations should have
the same right to refuse defense if the allegations are within an exclusion.
Other arguments raised in support of the pleading approach apply
specifically to the situation in which an indemnitee, who drafted the
agreement, seeks to recover defense costs after successfully defending a
claim under which it would not have been entitled to indemnity if the
defense were not successful. Proponents of the pleading approach argue
that the outcome approach creates a potential conflict of interest in this
context which the pleading approach avoids. 03 In this situation, it is in
the indemnitor's best interest to work against the indemnitee, since he
will have no obligation to indemnify or defend if the indemnitee loses.
At least one proponent of the outcome approach is willing to admit
that this argument has merit."
The proponents of the pleading approach have also argued that
requiring an indemnitor to defend an indemnitee against allegations
which, if proved, would preclude indemnity violates the principle of
construing an agreement against the drafter, since the indemnitee usually
drafts the indemnity agreement."'5 In both the oil and gas industry and
103. Original brief on behalf of third party defendants-appellants P.B.W., Inc., Na-
tional Security Fire & Casualty Co., and Integrity Ins. Co. at 19, Knapp.
104. See Memorandum of amicus curiae, Exxon Corp., addressing those issues raised
by the court in its order of May 5, 1986, at 2, Meloy.
105. Brief for third party defendants-appellees Broadmoor Corp., North River Ins.
Co., United States Fire Ins. Co., and International Surplus Line Ins. Co. at 17, Sullen
v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 750 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1985)(No. 83-3372).
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the construction industry, where indemnity agreements are most common,
the agreement is usually drafted by the indemnitee. Additionally, the
indemnitee frequently has more bargaining power and can be in a
position to impose adhesive terms on the indemnitor. Since Louisiana
law favors the nondrafting party and the party with the lesser bargaining
power, an approach should be used in interpreting the agreement which
gives the indemnitor the benefit of any doubt which might exist in the
contract. Thus, unless the contract clearly requires the indemnitor to
reimburse the indemnitee who successfully defends a case in which the
allegations would exclude indemnity if they were true, the indemnitor
should not be required to pay such costs. The outcome approach, which
requires the indemnitor to pay the costs if the defense is successful,
gives the benefit of the doubt to the indemnitee-drafter, contrary to the
policy of Louisiana law.
In most indemnity contracts, both "defend" and "indemnify" ap-
pear in the clause which defines the coverage of the agreement. Since
the same terms qualify each obligation, the proponents of the pleading
approach argue that where there is no duty to indemnify there can be
no duty to defend." ° Where the allegations would exclude indemnity if
they were true, there is no duty to indemnify if the allegations are
proved. If the allegations are not proved, there is no judgment against
the indemnitee which would require indemnity. Thus according to this
argument, regardless of the outcome of the case there is no duty to
indemnify under the terms of the agreement and consequently no duty
to defend.
Support for the Outcome Approach
The First Argument
Two arguments are generally used to support the outcome approach.
The first argument attempts to refute the insurance analogy. Indemnitees
point out that the pleading approach usually requires the insurer to
defend, since indemnity for fault of the insured is the specific object
of liability insurance policies. Furthermore, the indemnitees point out
that the insurers are simply being required to do something which they
bargained to do, since insurers specifically obligate themselves to defend
regardless of the truth or falsity of the allegations. Indemnitees then
argue that the pleading approach has the opposite effect in indemnity
cases. The approach usually results in the indemnitor not being required
to defend, since indemnity contracts usually do not provide coverage
106. Brief for third party defendants-appellees Broadmoor Corp., North River Ins.
Co., United States Fire Ins. Co., and International Surplus Line Ins. Co. at 15, Sullen.
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for the fault of the indemnitee. Since suits almost always allege fault
on the part of the indemnitee, assuming the allegations are true will
almost always negate the indemnitee's obligation to defend. Thus, the
indemnitees argue that the pleading approach nullifies the duty to defend
upon which the parties agreed.'0 7
There are several flaws in the indemnitees' attempt to refute the
insurance analogy. The indemnitees point out that the pleading ap-
proach results in a broadening of the duty to defend in insurance
cases and a narrowing of the duty in indemnity cases, and therefore,
the two types of cases are not analogous. The reason for the apparent
difference created by the application of the pleading approach is that
indemnity contracts usually have only one exclusion (fault of the
indemnitee), while insurance contracts usually cover fault of the in-
sured and have several other exclusions. Where there is only one
exclusion in the agreement, the obligation to defend is necessarily
broad from the beginning, and thus, any rule which affects the ob-
ligation to defend will probably narrow it. Insurance policies, on the
other hand, usually specify several situations in which the insurer does
not agree to provide coverage or defense. Thus, the initial obligation
is narrower and it is more likely that any approach which affects the
obligation will broaden it. In neither case does the pleading approach
require the indemnitee or insurer to do something which it has not
agreed to do; in the indemnity case, it actually protects the weaker
party-i.e., the indemnitor-from being required to do something to
which he did not agree.
The indemnitees also imply that, because the pleading approach
reaches a different result in the two types of cases, the analogy is
not proper. On the contrary, the pleading approach is designed to
protect the weaker of the two parties to the agreement. In the insurance
case, the weaker party is the insured. In the indemnity case, the
weaker party is the indemnitor. Thus, the pleading approach usually
protects the party with weaker bargaining power, and the apparent
difference in result is actually a similarity which reinforces the analogy.
The argument that applying the pleading approach to indemnity
cases nullifies the entire duty to defend is also flawed. The proponents
of the outcome approach assume that the plaintiff will never sue an
indemnitee without arguing that the indemnitee is at fault. The as-
sumption is clearly wrong. The most frequent type of indemnity case
occurs when an employee of a subcontractor sues the primary con-
tractor for injuries sustained on the job. If the subcontractor's work-
men's compensation insurance is not available, the employee can sue
107. Supplemental brief for the petitioner-appellant Conoco Inc. on suggestion of en
banc and consideration for rehearing at 2-4, Meloy.
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the primary contractor as statutory employer under the workmen's
compensation law without alleging negligence on the part of the pri-
mary contractor. There are also situations where fault of the indem-
nitee is not alleged, because it is vicariously liable for the torts of
others such as the indemnitor. Thus the pleading rule, even when it
is applied to contracts which do not require indemnity for the fault
of the indemnitee, does not completely nullify the obligation to defend.
The Second Argument
The second argument used by supporters of the outcome approach
is essentially a freedom of contract argument. 08 The indemnitee usually
argues that the language of the contract is very broad and clearly
expresses the intention of the parties to encompass almost every type
of claim. In the words of Chevron's attorney in Sullen:
Nowhere in the Contract is there any indication that the parties
did not intend for this language to encompass every conceivable
situation that might arise. Presumably, knowing how to write,
the parties could have included specific provisions excluding such
an interpretation [that payment of defense costs is required if
the indemnitee is found free of fault] had they so desired."' 9
Thus according to this argument, the contract read as a whole clearly
.expresses the intent of the parties to require the indemnitor to pay
defense costs where the indemnitee ultimately is found free of fault;
courts must enforce the intent of the parties as clearly expressed in this
contract.
• The outcome approach, however, does not favor freedom of contract
any more than the pleading approach does. The pleading approach does
not say that the indemnitor cannot be required to defend claims which
allege fault on the part of the indemnitee; rather, it recognizes that the
general terms used in most contracts do not require the indemnitor to
defend against allegations of indemnitee fault. There is nothing particular
to the pleading approach which necessarily prevents the parties from
using language that clearly requires the indemnitor to defend against
allegations of the indemnitee's fault. It should be noted, however, that
while the pleading approach does not prevent the drafting of clauses
requiring the indemnitor to defend against allegations of the indemnitee's
fault, the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act may void such clauses.
Likewise, however, the Act may void the contractual interpretation ad-
vocated by the proponents of the outcome approach.
108. See Memorandum of amicus curiae, Exxon Corp., addressing those issues raised
by the court in its order of May 5, 1986, at 7-8, Meloy.
109. Reply brief by limited appellant Chevron Chem. Co. at 7, Sullen.
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In the context of suits alleging fault of the indemnitee where the
indemnity agreement is broad, indemnitees also argue that the indemnity
agreement provides coverage for all liability except liability based upon
a finding of the indemnitee's own negligence. Since one of the items
indemnified against is always costs or expenses and the only exclusion
from coverage is usually fault of the indemnitee, the indemnitees argue
that if they prove that the one exclusion does not apply, they have
suffered a covered loss to the extent of the expenses of the suit." ° The
answer to this argument is that, since the same situation which triggers
the obligation to indemnify triggers the obligation to defend, the same
situation which negates the duty to indemnify negates the duty to defend.
If the obligation to indemnify is negated or not triggered, as when the
indemnitee is not liable to pay any damages, the obligation to defend
is likewise negated or not triggered, and no expenses can be recovered
from the indemnitor.
APPLYING THE ARGUMENTS,
A study of the cases indicates that three factors have influenced the
courts in determining whether or not an indemnitee has a duty to defend
or pay defense costs. The three relevant factors are the terms of the
indemnity agreement, the allegations of the pleadings in the case, and
the procedural posture of the case when the issue arises. The terms of
the contract can clearly require the outcome approach, clearly require
the pleading approach, or not specify which approach is required. The
pleadings may allege a set of facts which, if proved, would exclude
indemnity; a set of facts which, if proved, would require indemnity; or
two or more sets of facts one of which, if proved, would require
indemnity and another which, if proved, would exclude indemnity. The
posture of the case presents the most variables. The entire case could
be settled before trial with no determination of fault. The claim against
the indemnitee could be dismissed before trial, but at trial part of the
fault could be assigned to the indemnitee. The claim against the indem-
nitee could be dismissed before trial, and at trial the indemnitee could
be found free of fault. The claim against the indemnitee could be
dismissed before trial, and at trial the indemnitee's fault might not be
addressed. The indemnitee might remain in the case at trial, and the
plaintiff might prove a set of facts which would exclude indemnity under
the agreement. The indemnitee might remain in the case at trial, and
the plaintiff might prove a set of facts which would require indemnity
under the agreement. Or finally, the plaintiff could fail to prove his
110. Original brief of third party plaintiff-appellee Chevron U.S.A., Inc. at 10-12,
Knapp.
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case at trial. Combinations of these factors lead to a number of po-
tentially different situations. Fortunately, everyone seems to agree upon
the correct result in some of the situations.
Absent a specific statute (such as the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity
Act) or public policy voiding contract terms, everyone agrees that the
terms of the contract can specifically state how the obligation to defend
will be determined. Thus, if the parties choose to use language which
forces a determination based upon the pleadings, the pleadings will
obviously control. Likewise, if the parties choose language which clearly
states that the outcome will control the duty to pay defense costs, the
outcome will control. Although most contractual language is not specific
enough to force a particular result, some parties have chosen very specific
language. For example, the contract in Thibodeaux v. Texas Eastern
Transmission Corp. specifically provided:
"[McDermott] assumes entire responsibility for any third party
claims and actions based upon ... injuries . . . to persons ...
sustained ... in connection with or ... incidental to the per-
formance of this agreement ... regardless of whether such
claims of actions are founded in whole or in part upon alleged
negligence of ... [Texas Eastern] .... [McDermott] further
agrees ... to defend any claim or suit or action brought against
[Texas Eastern] . . .and to pay all damages, losses, costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by [Texas
Eastern] .. .as a result of the claim or institution of any suit
or action or the defense thereof."'"
The presence of the phrase "founded in whole or in part upon alleged
negligence of [Texas Eastern]" makes it abundantly clear that the final
outcome on the liability issue will not determine the obligation to defend
under this contract. The language of the contract in Lee v. Allied
Chemical Corp. was also very specific. The contract stated:
"[NATIONAL MAINTENANCE] shall be responsible for and
shall indemnify, exonerate and save harmless ALLIED CHEM-
ICAL ... against:
b) Any and all liability, damage, loss cost, expense, claims,
demands, suits, actions, judgments, or recoveries for or on
account of any injury to or death of persons ...whether or
not any such injury, death, or damage may have been caused
or alleged to have been caused by the negligence (whether
!11. Thibodeaux, 548 F.2d at 587 n.13.
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classified as active, passive, or otherwise) of ALLIED CHEM-
ICAL, or the condition of the premises or otherwise,
And [NATIONAL MAINTENANCE] shall at its own expense
defend any and all actions based thereon." ' 12
Here again, the language, "whether or not any such injury, death, or
damage may have been caused or alleged to have been caused by the
negligence ... of Allied Chemical," makes it clear that the ultimate
outcome on the liability issue shall have no bearing on the obligation
to defend.
At first it may seem strange that no contracts in the cases discussed
clearly specify that the indemnitor will have no obligation to defend
cases based upon allegations of the indemnitee's negligence. There are
also no contracts which specifically require the indemnitor to pay the
costs of defense if the petition alleges fault of the indemnitee and the
indemnitee is found free of fault. Nor are there any contracts which
specifically say that the indemnitor is not bound to pay the costs of
defense if the pleadings allege fault on the part of the indemnitee and
the indemnitee is found to be at fault. It must be remembered, however,
that most of the contracts in the cases discussed in this article were
written at a time when the law allowed the indemnitee to be indemnified
against its own negligence if the contract specifically mentioned indem-
nitee negligence. Indemnitees, therefore, drafted their contracts in the
broadest possible terms to take maximum advantage of the law. Contracts
freeing the indemnitor of the obligation to defend against allegations
of negligence, or contracts freeing the indemnitor of the obligation to
pay defense costs if the indemnitee were found free of fault, would
give the indemnitee-drafter less protection than the law and his bargaining
power allowed. Thus, such clauses do not appear in early contracts,
and the contracts are as indemnitee-oriented as possible. Nevertheless,
no one appears to have argued that during the time when the law
permitted an indemnitee to be indemnified for his own negligence, the
parties were not free to specify in their contract exactly how the ob-
ligation to defend would be determined. The same freedom remains
today subject to whatever limitations the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity
Act may impose.
Everyone also seems to agree that, since the passage of the Louisiana
Oilfield Indemnity Act, the law no longer permits the indemnitee to
recover indemnity or defense costs if it is ultimately found to be at
fault. The questions arise when the case against the indemnitee is disposed
of without a determination of the fault of the indemnitee or when the
indemnitee is ultimately found to be free of fault. The remainder of
112. Lee, 331 So. 2d at 609-10 (emphasis by the court).
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this section will discuss the arguments of both sides in the context of
these situations.
The first scenario concerns a case which is settled before it goes to
trial. In such a case the outcome approach cannot be used to determine
the obligation to pay defense costs, because the fault of the indemnitee
has not been determined. The settlement could, of course, specify who
would pay the defense costs, but if defense costs were not covered in
the settlement agreement or if the indemnitee was not a party to the
settlement, how would a court determine who was liable for the defense
costs? The court could hold a mini trial to determine the fault of the
indemnitee, but this would defeat one of the major purposes for settling
a case-avoiding a costly trial. Thus, the only practical means of de-
termining who is liable for defense costs under this scenario is the
pleading approach. If, assuming the allegations are true, indemnity would
be owed, then the indemnitor should be required to pay defense costs.
But if, assuming the allegations are true, the indemnitor would not be
required to indemnify, then he should not be required to pay the
indemnitee's defense costs.
Next, consider the case where the indemnitee's fault has not been
established and the pleadings allege facts which, if proved, would exclude
indemnity under the contract. If the contract language is not specific
enough to force a pleading approach or an outcome approach, the court
must decide what a fair construction of the agreement requires. The
rules of construction require the court to resolve any ambiguities against
the drafter, who is usually the indemnitee. Since the assumption is that
the terms of the contract are not specific enough to force a particular
approach, the court should adopt an approach which favors the non-
drafting indemnitor. To favor the indemnitor, all doubts must be resolved
against requiring defense. The pleading approach would not require
defense under this scenario, regardless of the final outcome as to in-
demnitee fault.
Other arguments also support the pleading approach under this
scenario. If the indemnitee loses its case, neither indemnity nor defense
will be owed. If the indemnitee wins its case, there will be no judgment
to indemnify against. Furthermore, the indemnitee probably carries a
general liability insurance policy to cover the defense costs in suits against
it. Forcing an indemnitee to pay its own defense costs when its own
fault is alleged should cause an indemnitee to be more careful in avoiding
acts which may lead to suits alleging its negligence, since its insurance
premiums will go up each time it is sued. If the indemnitor is required
to pay defense costs under this scenario, it is being required to pick
up a cost normally insured against by the indemnitee, and there is less
incentive for the indemnitee to be careful. Thus, the indemnitor is being
required to serve a liability insurance function. The legislature clearly
expressed its disfavor at allowing an indemnitee to shift any part of its
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liability insurance burden when it passed the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity
Act.
Perhaps the strongest argument against requiring the indemnitor to
defend in this situation is the irony which the outcome approach requires.
If the outcome approach is used, the indemnitor is encouraged to aid
the plaintiff rather than the indemnitee, because if the plaintiff wins
the case against the indemnitee, the indemnitor will not be required to
pay defense costs or the judgment. Therefore, the indemnitee is in fact
asking for aid from a person whose interests are diametrically opposed
to its own. This is particularly true if the indemnitor is also sued. If
he can succeed in shifting liability from himself to the indemnitee, he
can avoid both the cost of a judgment and defense costs.
Consider also the situation in which the pleadings allege facts which,
if proved, would require indemnity. In this situation the pleading ap-
proach would require the indemnitor to defend regardless of the truth
of the allegations. This situation usually arises when the indemnitee is
vicariously liable in some manner for the torts of the indemnitor. In
exchange for being relieved of the defense burden when that result would
encourage the indemnitee to be more careful, the indemnitor must bear
the defense burden when it will encourage him to be more careful.
Thus, it is not surprising that no indemnitee has argued against the
pleading approach in a case under this scenario. In fact, there are
apparently no cases in which an indemnitor has argued that he should
not be required to defend the case if the allegations are such that
indemnity would clearly be required if the allegations were proved.
Instead, indemnitors try to argue that the alleged facts, even if proved,
would not require indemnity under the contract.
Finally consider the situation where the pleadings allege at least one
set of facts which, if proved, would require indemnity and another set
which, if proved, would exclude indemnity. The pleading approach would
require the indemnitor to defend such a case because the pleadings do
not clearly exclude coverage; they permit proof of a set of facts which
might require both defense and indemnity. In this situation, the pleading
approach may allow an even broader duty to defend than the Louisiana
Oilfield Indemnity Act, since the Act would clearly prohibit the payment
of defense costs if the indemnitee were ultimately found at fault and
might, because of the allegations of the indemnitee fault, prohibit defense
costs even if the indemnitee were not found at fault.
Conclusion
On the whole, the pleading approach seems to provide a reasoned
and fair answer in all situations. The outcome approach, on the other
hand, gives little assistance in determining the obligation to defend when
the case is disposed of before the fault of the indemnitee is determined.
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It also gives little aid where the allegations of the pleadings permit proof
of a set of facts requiring indemnity and the plaintiff fails to prove his
case. The pleading approach does not abridge the freedom to contract
as the proponents of the outcome approach claim, and the mere fact
that the results in indemnity cases may be different from the results in
insurance cases does not demonstrate any flaw in the approach, since
the drafting position and bargaining power of the parties is different
in the two types of cases which are otherwise very similar. Finally, the
pleading approach is in line with Louisiana law which favors the non-
drafting party against the drafting party, and the party with less bar-
gaining power against the party with adhesion level bargaining power.
